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Abstract
Background: Negotiations surrounding the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade and investment agreement 
have recently concluded. Although trade and investment agreements, part of a broader shift to global economic 
integration, have been argued to be vital to improved economic growth, health, and general welfare, these agreements 
have increasingly come under scrutiny for their direct and indirect health impacts.
Methods: We conducted a prospective health impact analysis to identify and assess a selected array of potential health 
risks of the TPP. We adapted the standard protocol for Health impact assessments (HIAs) (screening, scoping, and 
appraisal) to our aim of assessing potential health risks of trade and investment policy, and selected a health impact 
review methodology. This methodology is used to create a summary estimation of the most significant impacts on 
health of a broad policy or cluster of policies, such as a comprehensive trade and investment agreement.
Results: Our analysis shows that there are a number of potentially serious health risks associated with the TPP, 
and details a range of policy implications for the health sector. Of particular focus are the potential implications of 
changes to intellectual property rights (IPRs), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), technical barriers to trade 
(TBT), investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), and regulatory coherence provisions on a range of issues, including 
access to medicines and health services, tobacco and alcohol control, diet-related health, and domestic health policy-
making.
Conclusion: We provide a list of policy recommendations to mitigate potential health risks associated with the TPP, 
and suggest that broad public consultations, including on the health risks of trade and investment agreements, should 
be part of all trade negotiations. 
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Implications for policy makers
• There are numerous connections between trade and investment agreements, specifically the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and public health. 
• Health impact assessment (HIA) methodology can be a valuable tool for exploring prospective health impacts of such agreements.
• Domestic health policy that is not compliant with trade rules is vulnerable to international trade disputes.
• There are opportunities for health policy-makers to play an active role in advocating for public health during domestic ratification of the TPP 
and to advocate for greater involvement in future trade negotiations.
Implications for the public
The content within contemporary trade and investment agreements goes far beyond the traditional trade agreement measures, such as cutting tariffs 
on goods, creating wide-reaching and long-lasting consequences for all aspects of life. The recently negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will 
have implications for public health issues, such as pharmaceutical prices and food safety standards, and may divert public tax dollars away from the 
provision of public services to payment of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) legal services and awards. The general public was denied access 
to the draft texts during negotiations, despite abundant input from the private sector throughout the deal. All countries are currently undergoing 
domestic processes that will enable them to ratify the deal, many of which have begun a period of public consultation. The general public should use 
this time to learn about the implications of the deal and take this opportunity to advocate for their rights and demands. 
Key Messages 
Background 
On the fifth of October 2015 negotiation of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) concluded, turning it from the biggest 
trade deal the general public had never heard of,1 to headline 
news overnight. The Agreement includes 12 Pacific Rim 
nations: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and 
Vietnam. Together these countries account for 40% of global 
gross domestic product (GDP) and 26% of global trade.2 
Although trade and investment agreements, part of a broader 
shift to global economic integration, have been argued to 
be vital to improved economic growth, health, and general 
welfare,3 these agreements have increasingly come under 
scrutiny for their direct and indirect health impacts. A body 
of literature exploring the relationships between international 
trade and investment agreements and health has been 
accruing over the past few years.4-12 But with the exception of 
one of those studies,11 the literature to date has largely been 
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conceptual in nature, and has rarely explored specific treaty 
text. 
With the official release of the TPP text a month after 
negotiations concluded[1], policy analysts could finally move 
past speculative assessments of the TPP’s impacts for health 
and begin to unpack the world’s largest free trade agreement. 
Existing analyses have thus far been conducted based on 
leaked texts only and have assessed a more limited number 
of health concerns related to the TPP.5,13-15 The following is 
a prospective health policy impact assessment of the TPP 
based on a range of potential public health risks introduced 
by previous assessments of leaked TPP text, and comparable 
existing agreements, to evaluate these concerns in light of 
the final text. Our analysis shows that there is a number of 
potentially serious health risks associated with the TPP, and 
details a range of policy implications for the health sector. 
We conclude with recommendations that could advise public 
consultations on the TPP to mitigate health risks. These 
recommendations are also meant to inform ongoing and 
future trade negotiations, given the increased recognition of 
the importance of policy coherence between international 
trade and investment agreements and domestic health policy.
Methods
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines health 
impact assessment (HIA) as “a combination of procedures, 
methods and tools by which a policy, program or project 
may be judged as to its potential effects on the health of a 
population, and the distribution of those effects within the 
population.”16 We adapted the standard protocol for HIAs 
(screening, scoping, and appraisal) to our aim of assessing 
potential health risks of trade and investment policy. While 
HIAs are increasingly used to evaluate the health effects of a 
diverse range of non-health policies, their application within 
foreign policy is very new,17 with only two HIAs of regional 
trade and investment agreements published thus far.14,18
Screening
In the HIA process, screening identifies potential links 
between the policy, program, or project, and the impacts it 
may have on health based on available opinion and evidence. 
We started by searching for key health risks related to TPP 
provisions within academic and civil society discourse. 
We found that previous analyses had highlighted potential 
implications of intellectual property rights (IPRs), investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS), technical barriers to trade 
(TBT), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), and 
regulatory coherence provisions on a range of issues, including 
access to medicines and health services, tobacco and alcohol 
control, diet-related health, and domestic health policy-
making.5,6,11,19-22 We screened several additional sections of the 
agreement, including provisions on trade in goods, trade in 
services, government procurement, labour, environment, and 
transparency and anti-corruption.
Scoping 
The next stage of the HIA is scoping which involves deciding 
which health effects to investigate, in which populations, 
and by which methods. Additionally, it requires selecting 
one of three approaches: (1) a rapid health impact appraisal; 
(2) a health impact analysis; or (3) a health impact review.16 
The first approach is a systematic assessment of the policy 
by experts and stakeholders in a short duration, while the 
second approach is a comprehensive assessment of the policy 
including a review of the available evidence, stakeholder 
opinions and expectations, and, if needed, production 
and analysis of new data. We selected the third approach, 
a health impact review, as it is the suggested method when 
in-depth analyses are not feasible because the policies 
under consideration are exceptionally broad, an appropriate 
selection for a review of a comprehensive regional trade and 
investment agreement. The goal of this approach is to create 
a “summary estimation of the most significant impacts on 
health of the policy or cluster of programmes and projects, 
without necessarily trying to disentangle the precise impact 
of the various parts of the policy or cluster on specific aspects 
of health…to give a broad-brush view of the impact” (p.7).16 
In the scoping stage, we elected to address the chapters 
identified in the literature at the screening stage. We limited 
our review to potential health risks, rather than potential 
health benefits, as one measure to keep the volume of work 
within scope for this review. We elected not to include a review 
of trade in goods or trade in services as each area includes 
a series of annexes and side letters on country-specific 
commitments, including customised tariff reduction phase-
in schedules and non-conforming measures that would make 
general impacts on health especially problematic to forecast. 
Additionally, the threats to health from trade in goods and 
services have long been a part of an increasingly integrated 
global economy, making changes directly attributable to the 
TPP difficult to surmise. The Government Procurement, 
Labour, and Environment Chapters were omitted given the 
length limitations of this article and because we currently 
have additional articles under review with different journals 
covering this area of interest. Finally, we scanned the 
Transparency and Anti-Corruption Chapter for relevant 
intersections with the Chapters included in this review. 
To increase the generalisability of our health policy impact 
review, we did not narrow our investigation of implications 
to any single population, or any single TPP country; however, 
we did at times consider specific vulnerabilities for developing 
country members of the TPP. Finally, our selected method for 
the appraisal stage was a prospective policy analysis (PPA) 
which explores future impacts of policy change23 based on 
existing expert knowledge and information gained from 
previous similar exercises and research. PPA has previously 
been used to explore the impacts of a bilateral trade agreement 
on a set of health policy goals.11 
Results
The following appraisal reviews the final text of the TPP for 
potential implications of IPRs, SPS, TBT, ISDS, and regulatory 
coherence provisions on a range of issues, including access to 
medicines and health services, tobacco and alcohol control, 
diet-related health, and domestic health policy-making.
Intellectual Property Rights 
One of the longest standing public health concerns with post-
World Trade Organization (WTO) trade and investment 
agreements has been their potential impact on the price of 
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pharmaceuticals. From the outset of TPP negotiations it was 
expected that IPRs would reflect the interest of the American 
pharmaceutical industry to extend patent protection and 
other measures that delay the entry of generic drugs into the 
market. The final IPR Chapter mitigates some, but not all, 
of these concerns, excluding some of the more contentious 
provisions in the leaked drafts, such as allowing patenting of 
new surgical techniques. The TPP adopts the WTO Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement 
provision that allows Parties to exclude from patentability 
“diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the 
treatment of humans or animals” (art.18.37, ¶3). 
The TPP is the first trade agreement to include provisions on 
pharmaceuticals that are, or contain, biologics, compounds 
produced through biological processes and which are used 
primarily for treating cancer and immune conditions. 
Biologics are costly to research and this expense is passed on 
to patients or their insurers, with some cancer drugs estimated 
to cost over $100 000 per year per patient.24 Monopolies 
for biologics are more effectively maintained through data 
exclusivity measures than the traditional patent system, given 
the difficulty in replicating the biologic process. Biosimilars 
or subsequent entry biologics are not generic products in 
the traditional sense25; data protection provisions can offset 
potentially less secure protection offered by patents. The 
United States had wanted market exclusivity on biologics 
for 8 to 12 years, using clinical trial data protection as one 
of the means to do so. The final IPR Chapter (art.18.52, ¶1) 
provides market exclusivity through data protection for 
at least 8 years, although it also provides Parties with the 
option of only 5 years protection as long as other measures 
“deliver a comparable outcome in the market,” ie, 8 years. 
The reason for this ambiguous wording is reportedly due to 
a political compromise reached between the United States 
and Australia in the last days of the negotiation in order to 
secure the Agreement, due to Australia’s refusal to agree to a 
data-exclusivity period of greater than 5 years.26 The impact of 
this provision on public and private costs for biologics is likely 
to be steep. The Chapter does affirm that, with respect to 
biologics, “a Party may take measures to protect public health 
in accordance with…the Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health” (art18.50, ¶3). Provisions in this Declaration allow 
countries to issue compulsory licences[2] for production of 
generic equivalents of patented drugs, lowering the price and 
increasing accessibility. Explicit reference to the Declaration 
on TRIPS in the TPP represents a small window of potential 
policy flexibility and a victory for public health that lobbied 
for its inclusion. Such provisions, however, have rarely been 
used apart from a brief post-Declaration period where most 
such licences were issued for drugs to treat HIV/AIDS.27 One 
could expect the United States to pressure countries into 
avoiding doing so in the case of biologics. 
There are several other provisions in the Chapter that could 
affect the price of medicines. Art.18.37, ¶1 allows for patenting 
of existing pharmaceuticals for “new uses, new methods of 
using…or new processes,” a TRIPS+ provision that can offer 
increased patent protection without the requisite innovation 
patents are designed to reward. Throughout the TPP’s 
negotiating period Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was 
critical of the impact extended patent terms would have on 
access to medicines, especially for developing countries. The 
TPP also requires Parties to provide patent term adjustments 
(extensions) to compensate for “unreasonable delays” in 
a government issuing a patent (art.18.46, ¶3). Patent term 
extensions were never part of the original TRIPS Agreement, 
and function to delay generic competition. The TPP is 
silent on the actual length of a patent term extension[3] if an 
‘unreasonable delay’ is encountered, which could provide 
Parties with flexibility for a short period or drug companies 
with cause to initiate a dispute for longer ones. Four TPP 
countries, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam, fall well 
below the economic development levels of high-income 
Parties and have been given a longer period in which to 
incorporate the TPP’s stringent IP provisions (3 to 10 years), 
although the use of set time periods takes no account of the 
actual development level or capacity of such countries to 
comply with their new IPR obligations. 
The TPP Chapter on Transparency and Anti-Corruption 
also contains provisions that apply to pharmaceuticals. A 
leaked draft Annex to this Chapter (Annex 26-A) had raised 
concerns about the ability of TPP countries with national 
healthcare programs (the United States, New Zealand, 
Australia, and Japan) to control or otherwise limit the costs 
of products on their covered drugs and medical devices lists.28 
There was considerable lobbying from within and outside of 
the negotiations to limit the ability of industry to affect the 
functioning of these national programs. These efforts resulted 
in several successes. Footnotes 11 and 12 in the final Annex 
clearly exclude government procurement and post-market 
subsidisation of pharmaceutical products and medical 
devices, including formulary management and development. 
This applies only to direct government procurement, however, 
and not to subsidy programs for private purchasers. 
At the same time, the Annex imposes more onerous reporting, 
consulting, and administrative requirements that apply to all 
Parties, including those that may, in the future, develop a 
national reference price system for drugs and medical devices. 
These additional implementation costs could be a deterrent 
for such reforms, particularly for developing country 
members of the TPP. The Annex requires Parties to permit 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to disseminate information 
via the internet to health professionals and consumers, the 
controversial ‘direct to consumer’ advertising that has often 
been found to be deceptive.29 This provision will be subject 
to each Party’s “laws, regulations and procedures” including 
any existing bans or restrictions on such marketing (¶A.3); 
however, in the case that a TPP country introduces a new 
prohibition or limitation on such dissemination this may be 
vulnerable to dispute. 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards 
While the inclusion of an SPS Chapter in the TPP was publicly 
known, projected concerns for food safety were made in 
general terms. The SPS Chapter in the TPP is intended to 
“reinforce and build on the SPS Agreement” (art.7.2b) within 
the WTO, the governing Agreement on food safety for traded 
goods which, in turn, defers to the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission for international standards. The Codex is tasked 
with two objectives, to protect the health of consumers and 
ensure fair practices in food trade. This stands in contrast to 
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the stated objective of the SPS Chapter, to “protect human, 
animal, and plant life or health in the territories of the Parties 
while facilitating and expanding trade by a variety of means to 
seek to address and resolve sanitary and phytosanitary issues” 
(art.7.2a, our emphasis). The Codex was never intended 
to ‘facilitate’ and ‘expand’ trade, only to ensure that trade 
practices were fair and protected human health first and 
foremost. 
The requirements for a Party to implement protections 
that exceed international standards has also been changed 
by the TPP. The WTO SPS Agreement acknowledged 
that, “Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures which result in a higher level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved 
by measures based on the relevant international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations, if there is a scientific 
justification” (art.3.3). The language of the TPP’s SPS 
Chapter states instead that, “Each Party shall ensure that its 
SPS either conform to the relevant international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations or, if its SPS do not conform 
to international standards, guidelines or recommendations, 
that they are based on documented and objective scientific 
evidence” (art.7.9, our emphasis). While the WTO SPS leads 
with a permissive statement that states are able to implement 
higher protections, the TPP SPS highlights the importance of 
conformity to international standards. Moreover, if a country 
elects to enforce standards that exceed the requirements of 
international standards, the burden for doing so shifts from 
a ‘scientific justification’ to one ‘based on documented and 
objective scientific evidence.’ Under the WTO Agreement 
‘scientific justification’ has been found to allow measures 
that are based on a minority scientific opinion30 which 
has been pivotal in permitting the implementation of the 
precautionary principle, something the TPP may undermine. 
The effect of this can only be fully understood after disputes 
have been raised and resolved under the TPP’s SPS Chapter 
and contrasted with those of the WTO’s SPS Agreement. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that the TPP’s SPS 
Chapter has qualitatively raised the bar for the burden of 
scientific evidence required to introduce domestic food safety 
protections that exceed international standards.
Further to this point, the TPP SPS Chapter has created a system 
for Cooperative Technical Consultations for Parties to discuss 
matters under the Chapter that may adversely affect trade, 
which must be pursued before Parties are able to seek dispute 
settlement. That all communications and documentation 
generated during a Consultation are kept confidential, unless 
otherwise agreed by the Parties, has created a concern that 
the Parties’ discourse on understandings of ‘science’ will be 
appropriated as confidential information.31 This provision 
also seems to be a contradictory sentiment to another TPP 
Chapter on Transparency and Anti-Corruption which 
states that “Each Party shall ensure that its laws, regulations, 
procedures and administrative rulings of general application 
with respect to any matter covered by this Agreement are 
promptly published or otherwise made available in a manner 
that enables interested persons and Parties to become 
acquainted with them” (art.26.2, ¶1).
Many observers expected the TPP Agreement to set 
standards and procedures for biotechnological advances in 
food production, including policies on genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs). However, the SPS Chapter in the TPP, the 
raison d’etre of which is to address matters of trade and food 
safety, which consequently has wide significance for GMO 
products,32 made no reference to GMOs. In an interesting turn 
of events the negotiators located Trade in Products of Modern 
Biotechnology for agricultural goods in the TPP Chapter on 
National Treatment and Market Access for Goods, agreeing 
that “nothing in this Article shall require a Party to adopt 
or modify its laws, regulations, and policies for the control 
of products of modern biotechnology within its territory” 
(art.2.29, ¶¶2-3). However, this applies only to the content of 
this specific article, which focuses primarily on “inadvertent 
low level presence” of GMOs permitted in the exporting, but 
not the importing, country. It does not preclude new measures 
through which GMO exporting countries could exert pressure 
on TPP member states holding to a ‘zero tolerance’ policy for 
such products.32 
One such measure is likely to be the creation of a Working 
Group “for information exchange and cooperation on 
trade-related matters associated with products of modern 
biotechnology” (art.2.29, ¶9). All Parties are able to “name 
one or more representatives to the Working Group.” It 
would not be unreasonable to suggest that Parties may allow 
representation to include corporations that receive direct 
financial benefit from the development and distribution of 
biotechnology in agriculture, perhaps representatives from 
companies like DuPont, Cargill, and Dow Agro-Sciences 
which all acted as private corporate advisers to the United 
States during negotiations.33 
Technical Barriers to Trade 
Several concerns were raised around the TBT Chapter 
guaranteeing avenues for vested interests to have a legitimised 
role in policy-making, and further reducing the capacity for 
domestic innovation in tobacco, alcohol, and food labelling 
policies.5,11,19 The final text of the TBT appears to deliver 
on these concerns. The terms of this Chapter are extensive 
and largely speak to harmonisation and transparency in 
the development of technical regulations, standards, and 
conformity assessments, arguably to the benefit of big 
industry rather than states.
The Chapter includes a provision that “nothing in this Chapter 
shall prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining technical 
regulations or standards, in accordance with its rights and 
obligations under this Agreement, the TBT Agreement and 
any other relevant international obligations” (art.8.3, ¶5). 
The first part of this provision gives the impression that there 
will be protection of domestic policy space and national 
sovereignty, but the second part immediately limits those 
actions to those in accordance with the obligations of the 
Agreement. In plain language such obligations mean that 
Parties can do whatever they like as long as it does not violate 
anything in the Agreement. The Chapter also includes a 
provision that “The Parties shall cooperate with each other, 
where feasible and appropriate, to ensure that international 
standards, guides and recommendations that are likely to 
become a basis for technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade” (art.8.5, ¶3, our emphasis). Under the 
Labonté et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2016, 5(8), 487–496 491
WTO’s TBT Agreement, dispute settlement panels, when 
weighing the necessity of regulations, refer to international 
standards. These standards were designed to protect things 
like consumer health and safety or the environment. The TBT 
provision in the TPP suggests that new international standards 
should be designed a priori to be least trade restrictive, in 
practice limiting any new protective standards to those that 
have already been vetted as trade-compliant. 
Moreover, the TBT Chapter creates new avenues for vested 
interests to participate in regulation-setting, including 
the provision that, “Each Party shall allow persons of the 
other Parties to participate in the development of technical 
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures 
by its central government bodies…on terms no less 
favourable than those it accords to its own persons” (art.8.7, 
¶1). According to the general definitions of the Agreement 
a person of a Party means a national or an enterprise of a 
Party (art.1.3), meaning persons would include multinational 
corporations that can claim nationality of that Party. Such 
provisions substantiate earlier concerns over the potential for 
regulatory capture19 or delays in developing new regulations 
and standards. The Chapter further seeks to have such rules 
extend outside state decision-making, adding that “Where 
appropriate, each Party shall encourage non-governmental 
bodies in its territory to observe the requirements” (art.8.7, 
¶3). In Canada, this may apply to Crown corporations 
which are not technically governmental bodies, such as the 
Standards Council of Canada. This Council’s mandate is to 
promote efficient and effective voluntary standardization in 
Canada, where standardization is not expressly provided for 
by law, and represents Canada’s interests in standards-related 
matters in foreign and international forums.
The TBT Chapter also introduces new delays and 
administrative encumbrances in policy-making, such that 
“Each Party shall normally allow 60 days…for another Party 
or an interested person of another Party to provide comments 
in writing on the proposal” (art.8.7, ¶10); and that, “Each 
Party is encouraged to provide sufficient time between the 
end of the comment period and the adoption of the notified 
technical regulation or conformity assessment procedure 
for its consideration of, and preparation of responses to, the 
comments received” (art.8.7, ¶11).
Finally, the TBT Chapter introduces the first ever Annex 
on Proprietary Formulas for Prepackaged Food and Food 
Additives (Annex 8-F). The Annex is brief but may make it 
more challenging for governments to acquire information 
on proprietary formulas, introducing the restriction that 
the Parties shall “ensure that its information requirements 
are limited to what is necessary to achieve its legitimate 
objective” (art.3a). However, when it comes to proprietary 
formulas, states may not even know which questions to ask, 
let alone be able to defend those questions as necessary to 
legitimate objectives. Moreover, what constitutes a ‘legitimate 
objective’ would, if it becomes a matter of dispute, be subject 
to interpretation by dispute panellists or ISDS tribunal 
members, and not by food policy experts.
Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
ISDS provisions in bilateral and regional trade agreements 
have generated widespread criticism and public health 
concern in recent years. Investment treaties and ISDS 
mechanisms that allow private investors to directly sue a 
government for compensation of losses (including anticipated 
future revenues) attributable to government measures are not 
new. However, the number of disputes, and the proportion 
being decided in favour of investors, has risen dramatically 
in the past decade,34 as has the monetary value of awards 
made by ISDS arbitration panels. A 2013 review of 196 
ISDS claims found that 40 involved health or environmental 
protection,35 including measures concerning food safety, 
pharmaceuticals and tobacco control measures. Most of 
the environmental disputes, over water, land-use, pollution 
control and hazardous waste, have important indirect health 
implications. The high costs of defending against a dispute[4], 
and the difficulty in knowing how a tribunal will rule in a 
case, are thought to contribute to ‘regulatory chill,’ in which 
governments become more reluctant to enact new policy 
for fear of being sued.37 The current system for ISDS has 
been criticised for continuing to lack a coordinating body, a 
mechanism for political oversight, rules on transparency, and 
legal processes to correct incorrect decisions.38 Arbitrators, in 
turn, have been criticised for creating a multimillion-dollar 
industry that they have promoted as necessary to attracting 
foreign direct investment, about which they have controlled 
the academic discourse and lobbied against reforms, and 
within which they have acted as negotiator, litigator, and 
arbitrator.39
Exceptions in the Investment Chapter suggest that 
governments do not fully trust these rules to provide adequate 
policy protection. Important to health is one such exception, 
allowing Parties to exclude any tobacco control measure from 
an investment dispute (art.29.5). This exception was the result 
of strong public health lobbying to prevent the TPP from being 
yet another treaty that could be used by tobacco transnationals 
to challenge tobacco regulations, as Philip Morris has done 
in challenging Australia’s tobacco plain packaging law and 
Uruguay’s health warning regulation under other investment 
treaties, with some countries initiating additional state-to-
state disputes under the WTO.[5] The ‘tobacco exceptionalism’ 
in the TPP, of course, will not prevent health regulations 
related to food, alcohol, or other health-harmful products 
from being challenged by investors. Neither will the TPP 
exception prevent investment challenges to tobacco control 
in the future using other agreements. Tobacco transnationals 
remain free to treaty-shop regardless of what the TPP 
prohibits, although this strategy was unsuccessful for Philip 
Morris in their claim against Australia plain packaging law, 
which was dismissed on jurisdiction. Finally, it is important 
to note that tobacco companies may still have input in the 
policy process through provision outlined in the transparency 
and regulatory coherence chapters, and that there can still be 
state to state tobacco disputes even where a state has exercised 
the option to block ISDS.
The fair and equitable treatment (FET) obligation is an 
ambiguous investor right, and the one most frequently 
invoked by investors. It is also the claim they are most likely 
to succeed on where all other claims have failed.40 It has been 
interpreted by tribunals to include increasingly expansive 
obligations for government. The TPP Investment Chapter 
appears to constrain FET, stating that “the mere fact that a 
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Party takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent 
with an investor’s expectations does not constitute a 
breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the 
covered investment as a result” (art.9.5, ¶4). This means 
that an investor’s expectations of future earnings alone are 
insufficient cause for a claim,41 a modification to treaty text 
that attempts to address concerns with previous awards. One 
such example was a 2015 NAFTA award in Bilcon v. Canada, 
in which an American investor argued that an environmental 
review that denied its proposed quarry was discriminatory, 
since other quarry applications by Canadian firms had been 
approved. Two of the three tribunal members ruled that the 
environmental decision frustrated the investor’s “legitimate 
expectations,” thereby violating NAFTA’s FET obligation 
(despite such wording not actually appearing in NAFTA). 
The investor sought US$300 million in damages, although an 
award has yet to be made. The third tribunal member strongly 
disagreed with this interpretation, arguing that the decision 
“will create a chill on the operation of environmental review 
panels,”42 but in ISDS tribunals majority decisions are binding. 
Annex 9-B to the Chapter contains limitations on indirect 
expropriation, which refers to “an action or series of actions by 
a Party [that] has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation 
without formal transfer of title or outright seizure” (Annex 9-B, 
¶3). The determination of indirect expropriation in a dispute 
has to consider, amongst other factors, “the extent to which 
the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable 
investment-backed expectations” (Annex 9-B, ¶3 (a) (ii)). 
Within a footnote it is clarified that “[f]or greater certainty, 
whether an investor’s investment-backed expectations are 
reasonable depends, to the extent relevant, on factors such as 
whether the government provided the investor with binding 
written assurances and the nature and extent of governmental 
regulation or the potential for government regulation in the 
relevant sector.” The language of the footnote, that it includes 
‘factors such as,’ implies that this is not intended to be an 
exhaustive list, which does not adequately address concerns 
about ambiguity in what tribunals will be able to consider as 
additional factors forming legitimate expectations.
Government claims that the TPP ensures their right to 
regulate in the public interest is also questionable. This claim 
is based on Article 9.15, that, “nothing in this Chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or 
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter 
that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment 
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive 
to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.” 
Unfortunately, the phrase ‘otherwise consistent with this 
Chapter’ means that governments can regulate in the public 
interest only if they comply with all of the other obligations in 
the Investment Chapter. Thus, governments are not, in fact, 
protected from state-state or investor-state disputes arising 
from regulatory changes they may undertake to protect 
environment, health or any other public purpose. 
Similar to other new investment agreements, the Chapter 
includes IPRs in its definition of an investment, thus patented 
pharmaceuticals fall under its provisions. Extending TPP 
ISDS to more countries, including Japan which has its 
own pharmaceutical industry, could increase drug-related 
disputes similar to the one Canada is now facing with Eli 
Lilly. Canada’s ‘promise of patent’ rule led to Canadian courts 
revoking patents on two of Eli Lilly’s drugs because they failed 
to fulfill the promise of increased utility made at the time of 
patent filing. After losing in Canadian courts, the company 
turned to NAFTA’s ISDS rules and is seeking US$500 million 
in compensation. There is one article in the TPP’s IPR Chapter 
which allows a patent to “be cancelled, revoked or nullified” 
but “only on ground that would have justified a refusal 
to grant the patent” (art18.39, ¶1). This article appears to 
support Canada ‘promise of the patent’ rule that is the subject 
of the Eli Lilly dispute, although it does not, in itself, prevent a 
challenge from arising; nor is it known how this article might 
be interpreted by a tribunal should a similar dispute arise 
under the TPP. 
While some progress has been made on issues of transparency 
of investment tribunals, many concerns remain unaddressed 
in the TPP. Although the Investment Chapter includes a 
provision for amicus curiae (‘friend of the court’) submissions 
from third parties “regarding a matter of fact or law” (art.9.22, 
¶3), there is nothing binding on a tribunal to allow such 
submissions or to take them into account in their rulings. 
The Chapter, while recognizing that information presented 
before a dispute panel should be governed by governments’ 
own information laws, calls on governments to “endeavour 
to apply those laws in a manner sensitive to protecting from 
disclosure information that has been designated as protected 
information” (art.9.23, ¶5). 
Finally, the TPP Parties have agreed to create a ‘Code of 
Conduct’ for ISDS arbitrators. As this is still to be drafted, its 
content is unknown; a point we return to later in this article.
Regulatory Coherence
The leaked draft of the Regulatory Coherence Chapter 
prompted concerns of a pro-industry approach to domestic 
policy and regulation, including new avenues for private 
actor involvement in the policy process.20 Although the treaty 
text (both the leaked and final version) acknowledges “each 
Party’s sovereign right to identify its regulatory priorities and 
establish and implement regulatory measures to address these 
priorities, at the levels that the Party considers appropriate” 
(art.25.2, ¶2b), the language used to preface this, that they 
“affirm the importance of ” such rights, gives the impression 
of a platitude.
Several provisions within the Chapter will increase the 
burden on domestic regulatory systems. Article 25.3, for 
example, requires that within one year after entry into force 
in their territory, each Party must “make publicly available the 
scope of its covered regulatory measures…each Party should 
aim to achieve significant coverage.” In addition, there are 
provisions that Parties will create processes or mechanisms to 
facilitate interagency consultation and coordination (art.25.4, 
¶1), as well as review at intervals it deems appropriate its 
covered regulatory measures to determine if they “should be 
modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed” (art.25.5, ¶6). 
Current domestic procedures in each of the TPP member 
countries will dictate the level of challenge in introducing 
such measures, although it is reasonable to believe that the 
lower-income members of the Agreement will have reduced 
human resources for such administrative tasks and will bear a 
disproportionate burden during implementation.
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Whether the Regulatory Coherence Chapter will permit 
industry manipulation of domestic regulatory systems is 
open for debate. Provisions which reinforce that the TPP’s 
Committee on Regulatory Coherence (¶25.6) “shall…
provide opportunities for interested persons of the Parties 
to provide input on matters relevant to enhancing regulatory 
coherence” (¶25.8), and will take into account such input 
in the development of regulatory measures, de jure opens 
the door to all individuals. Whether industry, de facto, will 
be the only group to take advantage of this remains to be 
seen. Similarly, the prescribed interagency coordination 
may improve domestic policy coherence between health and 
trade objectives; however, if representatives from industry, 
finance, and trade are reviewing policies within health and 
the environment without a reciprocal exchange, then positive 
outcomes for health and environmental protection are less 
likely. The inclusion of a Regulatory Coherence Chapter is still 
new to trade and investment agreements, and no agreement 
currently in force contains one, thus time will be needed to 
understand the public health regulatory impact of its content. 
However, the exclusion of any matter under the Regulatory 
Coherence Chapter from challenge under dispute settlement 
procedures (art.25.11) is a win for public health. 
Discussion
Our health impact review of the TPP demonstrates that most 
of the concerns of the public health community raised during 
the negotiation process have not been addressed in the final 
TPP text. The IPR provisions are likely to contribute to rising 
pharmaceutical prices, particularly for biologics, threatening 
affordable access to essential medicines in TPP countries. 
Key mechanisms include longer protection for clinical trial 
data, weaker requirements for new patents on old drugs, and 
threats to government-sponsored pharmaceutical benefit 
schemes. What is more, given that drug costs represent a 
significant share of public expenditure in some TPP countries, 
an increase in spending in this area may lead to cuts in social 
spending in other, potentially health–sensitive, areas. 
While the SPS and the TBT Chapters within the TPP go slightly 
further than the original WTO Agreements in some respects, 
it is important to note that their general approach is already 
well-enshrined in the WTO’s TBT and SPS Agreements. 
However, provisions in the TPP’s SPS Chapter are likely to 
increase the burden of scientific evidence required for food 
safety standards, challenging the use of the precautionary 
principle in health, while new private committees established 
to discuss potential disputes in this area are moving away 
from transparency in policy-making. The TBT Chapter, in 
an effort to create regulatory harmonisation, has introduced 
new opportunities for private actor involvement in policy-
making and policy delays due to administrative demands, 
while failing to adequately protect health policy space. What 
is more, the TBT Chapter is seeking to design international 
standards a priori to be compliant with trade aims and rules. 
The Regulatory Coherence Chapter amplifies these same 
concerns, introducing new outlets (or cementing such outlets 
in countries where they already exist) for private sector 
participation in policy-setting and administrative burdens 
on TPP governments specific to regulatory policy. Inclusion 
of ISDS mechanisms in the Investment Chapter without 
addressing concerns regarding the constructive ambiguity of 
investor rights or the issues of transparency and conflict-of-
interest in the arbitration system continue to leave signatory 
states vulnerable to expensive litigation and potential 
regulatory chill. More empirical research is needed, however, 
to assess the extent to which regulatory chill limits health 
policy space in practice, as there are still few such studies in 
this area.
In light of the material above, we have several recommendations 
for countries undergoing domestic processes to bring the TPP 
into force to mitigate the potential health risks introduced by 
this Agreement. These recommendations are generalizable 
to ongoing and future trade and investment negotiations, 
and directly relate to some of the recommendations that 
have recently emerged in the global governance for health 
literature, including concerns for representing health interests 
in non-health global governance venues and the need for 
multi-level governance mechanisms to replicate the shift 
from the multilateral to the bilateral/regional level in trade 
negotiations.43,44 
The first recommendation is that more comprehensive 
assessments of the health impacts of the TPP should be 
conducted in the near future, including on Chapters that 
were omitted from this truncated review, such as government 
procurement, labour, environment, goods and services. 
Such assessments should explore both positive and negative 
potential health impacts. Our next recommendation is very 
broad: governments should ensure they provide adequate 
time for their ministries, and interested groups of the 
general public, to consider the potential impacts of this and 
similar agreements. The TPP is over 6000 pages and will 
have consequences for decades to come, as well as setting 
a precedent for future ‘21st century’ agreements. Such a 
document is thus deserving of a transparent public consultation 
process of substantial length to ensure that all governments 
read carefully and act cautiously. In future negotiations, 
transparency and public consultation during the negotiation 
process, and increased access for public health experts and 
other groups interested in protecting general welfare, is 
needed. Since agreements such as the TPP no longer concern 
simply trade in goods and services, but ‘behind the border’ 
regulatory regimes, participation in framing negotiations and 
discussing particular articles and their commitments should 
not be restricted to private economic actors alone. 
The third recommendation is to adequately address 
the concerns that have been raised around the current 
international arbitration system, including transparency and 
conflicts of interest. The European Commission (EC) has 
proposed new provisions for ISDS in their ongoing bilateral 
negotiations with the United States. The EC proposes an 
‘investment court system’ (ICS) which would include 15 
‘judges’ (5 each from the EU, the United States, and all other 
regions) appointed to serve as tribunal members. Unlike 
current ISDS tribunals, where each side chooses an arbitrator 
who then choose a third member, the ICS judges would be 
appointed at random, removing at least one source of bias in 
the present system. The EC proposal also calls for creation of 
an Appeal Tribunal to hear appeals on initial dispute rulings, 
similar to the functioning of the Appellate Body of the WTO; 
and prevents appointed judges from acting as counsel or 
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witness in any other investment dispute. These provisions are 
marked improvements. Its Annex II on a Code of Conduct, 
however, is little more than exhortations to good behaviour 
by judges; and unless the TPP adopts more of the structural 
features of the ICS, adopting its Code of Conduct alone would 
do little to overcome the flaws in the current system[6]. Until 
these points are clarified through public scrutiny of the to-
be-drafted TPP Code of Conduct, governments should not 
take steps to complete domestic processes towards bringing 
the Agreement into force. Moreover, if countries have been 
given the option, at any time, to exclude tobacco control 
from ISDS, it is reasonable to challenge governments on why 
the same option is not extended to any non-discriminatory 
health or environmental regulation or control measure. More 
fundamentally, where is the evidence that such investor 
powers and guarantees are needed to fulfill the initial intent 
of investment agreements: to prevent direct or indirect 
government expropriation of an investor’s assets in the 
absence of a fair and transparent judicial system? 
With respect to the SPS and TBT Chapters, it is not clear 
why more obligations than those in existing WTO SPS and 
TBT Agreements are needed. The best public health option 
here is to urge removal of these Chapters from the TPP, or 
for Parties to incorporate exclusions to any new provisions 
in these Chapters that exceed those in the WTO Agreements. 
It is more difficult to consider how the new Regulatory 
Coherence Chapter should be amended, although seeking 
immediate public commitment from the governments of each 
Party that public health and civil society groups, as ‘interested 
persons of the Parties’, shall, at a minimum, have at least equal 
representation in providing input into regulatory coherence 
as that provided by industry groups, and that all such input be 
transparent and publicly accessible.
There are three general conclusions about the TPP that can be 
made, albeit with the usual caveats about the risk of prediction. 
First, the TPP cannot come into force for any country unless 
the United States completes its domestic processes to bring 
the TPP into force. Second, domestic governance rules in the 
United States do not permit any change in wording of the TPP 
text, although side letters and binding interpretations will be 
available. Third, given the defensive nature of the TPP for 
most high-income country Parties (a fear of what they would 
lose if not part of the Agreement dominated by the United 
States) and the limited aggregate welfare gains[7], it may be 
time for some of the Parties to simply say no, and to re-think 
and re-calibrate the purpose of such trade deals: To promote 
human well-being and development in a context of fragile 
and diminishing natural resources, or to increase the powers 
of investors and transnational corporations to accumulate 
capital.
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Endnotes
[1] The TPP cannot come into force until one of the following conditions has 
been met: (1) all original signatories complete their domestic processes within 
2 years of signing; (2) at least 6 countries complete their domestic processes 
within 2 years of signing and they account for at least 85% of the combined GDP 
of the original signatories; or (3) at least 6 countries complete their domestic 
processes and they account for at least 85% of the combined GDP of the 
original signatories. The United States accounts for 60% of the combined GDP 
of the original signatories, meaning the TPP cannot come into force without the 
United States.
[2] Countries can issue a compulsory license for drugs patented in its 
jurisdiction for the supply of a developing country if the recipient country can 
demonstrate evidence of a public health concern, evidence that the importer’s 
pharmaceutical industry is non-existent or inadequate, and proof that the drug 
will be used only for public, non-commercial purposes.
[3] The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between 
the European Union (EU) and Canada (still awaiting ‘legal scrubbing’ and 
ratification) offers some indication of what might be expected with the TPP. The 
EU is granting up to 5 years of patent term restoration (the CETA term for an 
extension), although Canada has only agreed to a maximum of 2 years. When 
the WTO TRIPS Agreement was reached, it was assumed that the 20 years 
of patent protection it afforded would be sufficient to account for any delays in 
government marketing approval.
[4] Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates from 2012 
suggested that the cost was approximately US$8 million for each side; 
however, this estimate is likely outdated as Australia reportedly paid US$50 
million to defend against Philip Morris Australia’s claim against their tobacco 
plain packaging case,36 a case that concluded at the jurisdiction phase. This 
number would likely have increased substantially if the case had proceeded to 
the merits phase.
[5] Some public health advocates are concerned that the TPP tobacco exclusion 
does not apply to state-to-state disputes. This may be an issue under TRIPS, 
one of the WTO Agreements cited in the remaining 4 country disputes against 
Australia’s plain packing law, since how a dispute panel rules around whether 
Australia’s law violates tobacco companies’ intellectual property in their 
trademarks and brand names/differentiations remains to be seen. Generally, 
however, WTO dispute panels of late have been allowing health regulations 
considerable latitude, provided they are not obviously discriminatory.
[6] There are other weaknesses in the EC proposal, including its inclusion of 
FET provisions and its restriction of the ‘right to regulate’ by governments to 
‘legitimate policy objectives,’ leaving again the determination of what constitutes 
legitimate not to public policy experts, but to its ICS judges whose qualifications 
are defined solely by their expertise in trade and investment law.
[7] The most widely cited estimate of TPP annual income gains (achieved only 
in 2025) average 0.5% of GDP across all 12 countries, only 0.2% more than 
the background trend.45 A recent study using different modelling assumptions 
estimated even lower economic gains alongside net employment losses.46 
Estimates of trade-related welfare gains, which can affect health through the 
employment (or loss thereof) arising from new liberalisation commitments, vary 
widely according to the models used. In general, media reports of the expected 
gains of the TPP have been greatly exaggerated.47
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